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APPELLANTS1 BRIEF FOR RE-HEARING
STATEMENT

Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, fifom an adverse decision
of an Honorable Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court, the
Supreme Court in a unanimous decision written by Justice Hall,
upheld the lower court ruling.

Two of tlie appellants have filed

a petition herein, pursuant to Rule 76 (e) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, requesting this court td reconsider its decision,
alleging in support thereof, that this honorable court erred in
ruling, and/or failed to adequately consider certain arguments ,
raised on appeal.

The petitioners restate, by reference, the

facts as set forth in their original bri^f*

- 2 -

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
The appellants would urge the court to reconsider its
decision of February 9, 1977, and to reverse said decision,
either in wrhole or in part, as follows:
1.

To reverse the decision that the guardianship was a

"nullity", and to allow the petitioners the benefit of a
validly appointed guardian as a bar to the foreclosure of
the subject mortgage, or that failing, then in the alternative;
2. To divide the mortgage into the seven amounts set forth
in the mortgage, and reduce the mortgage by the sum
attributed to each of the defendants not counter-claiming
herein.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RIGHT TO PETITION FOR REHEARING REQUIRES NO PRECEDING
ACTS BY THE PETITIONERS.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
"Within 20 days after the filing of the decision of the
Supreme Court, either party may petition the court for a
rehearing. The petition shall state briefly the points
wherein it is alleged that the appellate court has erred.
The petition shall be supported by a brief of the authorities relied upon to sustain the points listed in such
petition. Both the petition and brief in support thereof
must be prepared in accordance with the requirements of Rule
75(p), and shall be served upon the adverse party prior to
filing."
(Rule 76(e)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.)
This rule requires the party requesting a rehearing to do the
following:
A.

A petition for rehearing within twenty days.

B.

A brief to support the petition.

C.

To be done in accordance with Rule 75 (p) U.R.C.P.

- 3 Counsel for petitioners apologizes if the rule of the court would
require or prefer that both the petition bnd brief in support of
the petition, be filed simultaneous.

Inasmuch as that procedure

was not clear to this counsel, and he was under the impression
that the brief could be filed later, coun|sel did so, and apologizes to this court, and assures the courti, that the failure was
not meant as either a discourtesy or an Attempt to delay these
proceedings.
There is nothing in the rules that rjequires a party to have
either filed a response brief or to request oral arguments in
order to petition for a rehearing.

The right to request a

rehearing is founded on the principle that a party is grieved by
a decision of the Supreme Court, and reasonably believes that in
making that decision, the court either failed to consider some
material point, or that it erred in its conclusion, or that some
matter has been discovered which was unknown at the time of
original hearing.

(See In re McKnight, 4 U 237, 9 P.299, Brown

v. Piekard, 4 U. 292, 9 P.573, 11 P. 5121)
It is so obvious- that a party cannot be grieved by a decision
of the court until a decision is reachedL that for any person to
argue or suggest that the failure to file a responsive brief or
to request oral arguments is a waiver of Ithe right to a rehearing,
is incredulous.
POINT II
THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THESE DEFENDANT^ SHOULD NOT BE NULLIFIED
BY OR IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
I
The decision of this court would suggest that the appellants
did not address themselves on appeal to (the ruling of the trial

- 4 court regarding the "nullity" of the guardianship proceedings.
Petitioners would suggest that in factf the trial court did not
directly rule on the question of the "nullity" of the guardianship,
that nevertheless, the appellants brief addressed itself in
several particulars to the guardianship and the results of a
"valid" guardianship on the mortgage in question and the relative
rights of the appellants and the defendants by reason of the
same. Inherent in the arguments of the appellants, was the fact
that the appellants and the general public were entitled to both
assume and presume that the guardianship proceedings were exactly
what another division of the lower court had determined them to
be, i. e., valid acts, and that if they were not valid, that the
proper place to pursue the same was by the defendants against the
guardian, in the guardianship file in that court.

The question

of the validity of that guardianship was not an issue before the
lower court, (see Pre-Trial Stipulation), but rather, the parties
stipulated:

that a guardianship did in fact exist, (thus concluding

or presuming the same valid); that the mortgage by the guardian
to the defendants had never been included as an asset of that
guardianship; and, that there was no record that it was or was
not paid.

When Ezilda Hendricks was appointed guardian, she was requi

to post a good and sufficient surety, and only after due and
proper notice was given and at a hearing duly held, with evidence
introduced as required by law.

That appointment was nearly

fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commencement of this
law suit.

At that time, no person 6t

party, including the

defendants, were entitled to directly attack the guardianship
proceeding due to the operation of the statute of limitations, or

- 5 laches, or by operation of law, except perhaps in the guardianship
file itself.

It thus seems improper for either this court or the

trial court to determine in a separate and unrelated matter, that
the guardianship was a "nullity", because the guardian failed to
include a mortgage as part of the trust estate.

It would seem to

the appellants that the more proper course to follow would be for
the court to determine that the guardian's actions relating to
the mortgage were such that a cause of action might lie between
the minors and their guardian, but that the effects of that
failure or any other act, could not be tried in this proceedings,
since to do so would be without the benefit of proper notice
postings, etc., as required in guardianship matters, and with out
ALL necessary persons being parties.
The de facto result of the decision issued by this court, is
to judicially void a guardianship proceedings, without due process
of law.

Thus, without properly pleading the acts leading to a

conclusion that the guardianship was a nullity; without testimony
on that issue; without proper service on ALL interested or
required parties to the matter; without the required posting in
guardianship matters, etc., the court has determined that the
guardianship was a nullity.

Such a result seems to be a patent

error, and places innocent and interested third parties who have
relied on the guardianship proceedings, in possible peril of
their property rights.

A person should be entitled to rely upon

the prior decisions of the court that have consistently held that
if minors have a duly appointed guardianJ that the statute of
limitations will run as to said minors, by reason of the guardian.
(See Parr v. Zions First National Bank 1^ Utah 2d 404, 375 P.2d
461.)

- 6In this particular fact situation, because of the court records,
the appellants knew of the duly appointed guardian for most of
the defendants; they knew that in 1967, that the guardian, who
was the defendants1 mother, had attempted to quiet title to the
subject property, and had failed; they were aware that this court
had previously held that the appointment of a guardian caused the
statute of limitations to run against minors, and that the "tolling"
of the statute because of the disability of the minor, ended with
the appointment of a guardian,. Should the opinion of the court
remain unchanged, then the law in this state relative to the
effect of the appointment of guardians shall of necessity undergo
a radical change.

Any person dealing with: a guardian; or, with

property that any time involved a guardian; or, a person who may
have

had a guardian, will have to inquire or ascertain as to

whether the guardian ever borrowed money from the minors or
mortgaged property to the minors, because if such in fact occurred,
and the guardian did not include the same in the inventory or
repay the same, then the entire guardianship proceedings would be
subject to being declared a nullity, in any proceedings and the
third party would be placed in jeopardy and would act at his own
peril.

In the instant case, we have a situation where the guardians!

has now been declared to be null and void, i. e., it never existed,
and since this was done outside of the quardianship file itself,
we have no idea of how many other persons or parties have relied
upon that proceeding in their dealing with the guardian and the
estate in the hands of the guardian, who may now also be hurt, or
have their reliance on the existance of the guardianship, declared
to be a "nullity.w

If the guardianship proceeding is null or

- 7 void as to this matter, then surely the guardianship is completely
voidf because it cannot be just a "littl^ bit" void, and notwithstanding that determination by the court, there will be nothing
in the guardianship file to indicate thati it has been judicially
determined to be a nullity.

In addition, what now happens to all

other proceedings in that file and persons who have in good faith
dealt with the guardian?

The only consistent position is to

declare those acts a nullity too.

The result of such a decision

is not only unconscionable, but is obviously wrong and unfair,
for it has the same effect and produces the same results as an
ex post facto law.

The true remedy and recourse for the defendants

and counter-claimants who did not have their mortgage timely foreclosed,
should be against their guardian, whoeveq that guardian might be.
While, as the court's decision suggests, lit is highly unlikely
that a guardian would sue herself to foreclose the mortgage, it
must be remembered that she did take certain oaths, and, just
such a fact situation is undoubtedly one of the reasons why this
state has adopted a statute requiring all guardians appointed by
the court must post bond or surety, no matter who they are, or,
the oath they take, before letters of guardianship will issue,
just as this guardian did.

That bond is to protect minors

against just such an occurrence is had asl when a guardian will
not sue herself.

Because this guardian did not sue herself, and

because these defendants chose not to sue their mother directly,
or to even question her regarding her failure to "timely"
foreclose their mortgage, should not be a\ reason for this court
to change the law relative to the running of the statute of

- 8 limitations as to minors with duly appointed guardians.

This

"new" rule by the court will give all minors another way of
accomplishing what they failed to do by neglecting to sue their
guardian for failing to marshall their estate, etc., and has the
effect of judicially altering the statutes regarding minors,
their guardians, and limitation of actions, without the benefit
of legislation.
Appellants urge, that far more mischief will be done by the
court declaring the guardianship to be a nullity due to the
guardian's failure to marshall an asset of the estate, than good
can possibly result from adopting such a new principle of law.
IF we were considering only the guardianship proceeding, and ijf
proper notices of the proceedings were sent to the parties involved
in the proceeding, including the sureties of the guardian, and
evidence was adduced for the express purpose of the minors attempting to void their guardianship by their mother, then perhaps the
result reached by the court would be more palatable to the appellants, and consistent with the prior rulings of this court.
However, the only relevant stipulated facts before the court
relative to> the guardianship was that "on March 19, 1958, Ezilda
Hendricks was appointed by this court as guardian of her minor
children.

That guardianship action, Civil No. 1458, was funded

from deposits of other moneys from the individual trust accounts
with the Bureau, but said action did not list the mortgage as an
asset."

There was no stipulation or statement in the rest of the

agreed facts that in any way questioned the validity of that
guardianship proceedings, nor was any issue framed for trial

9 to suggest or would lead the court to coriclude that the "administration of the guardianship estate was a |nullity."

In fact, the

lower court did not make a specific finding as to that point, nor
is the decision of the trial court explicit in such a conclusion.
Nevertheless, appellants feel that they reasonably objected on
appeal, to any findings of the trial coui[t that would lead to the
conclusion that the guardianship was a "ijullity", by appellants
repeated arguments that there was, in facjt, a duly appointed
guardian of the minor defendants from and after March 19, 1958.
The mere fact that the file of the guardianship proceeding was
not the file or action in issue before tljis court, should have
been sufficient reasoning or basis for t\\e

court to have refused

to reach a conclusion that "the administration of the guardianship
estate was a nullity."
court to stand, will,

For that conclusion or decision of the
as previously urg^d, open all transactions

previously approved by the court in the guardianship action, to
being set aside or vacated, even though rfelied upon in good faith
by other innocent third parties, including the surety of the
guardian.

That is the only logical result that can be expected

from a conclusion that the guardianship Was a "nullity", unless
of course it is just "a little bit null".
Additional problems can also be assumed from such a conclusion,
because according to the stipulated fact^, "In 1962 or 1963,
First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., Trust Department, became the
trustee of the defendants1 estates.

The funds remaining in the

hands of the guardian, Ezilda Van Hendridks, were turned over to
that trustee....".

Suppose that the mortgaged premises are now

- 10 sold to satisfy the judgment of foreclosure, and the proceeds
from said sale are insufficient to satisfy the sum due and owing
to the defendants, in such an event, will these defendants now be
able to rely upon the authority of these proceedings and this
decision to commence an action against First Security Bank for
failing, as their duly appointed trustee, to marshall the assets
of their estate, and have the court rule that after these many
years that those proceedings were also a nullity, and that any
and all transactions concluded or conducted by First Security in
the proceedings relative to its acts as trustee,

can now be set

aside as a nullity and as if they had never been done?

While the

absurdity of such a result is evident, nevertheless, that very
conclusion seems very analogous to the results that the decision
reached by the court would obtain.

For such a line of case law

to develop in this state seems to be a very dangerous and improper
thing and will leave all guardianship proceedings open to collateral
and far-reaching attack, at any time, without regard to statutes,
determinal reliance, laches, etc.

Whether appellants directly

addressed themselves to that matter in their brief, or whether
the trial court went that far in its decision, seems to be secondary
to the greater issue, of what will be the result if the precedent
of such a decision should remain.

Petitioners respectfully urge

the Honorable Justices of this court to reconsider their decision
relative to the same, and to conclude that although the guardian
did act in a form and manner that was subject to having her
removed as the guardian of the minors, that the proper method for
her removal was pursuant to the terms of Title 75-6-1 and 75-13-9

- 11 of the Utah Code Annotated, and not by or] through an unrelated
proceeding.

Appellants believe and again assert that the real

thrust of their appeal and the arguments raised in their brief
was based upon the validity of the guardianship proceedings, and
the belief in that validity was based upon the assumption that
the guardian was properly appointed to serve, and that until she
was removed in the manner prescribed by the statutes of this
state, or, until a direct attack upon her administration was
commenced in the guardianship proceedings itself, that she would
continue to so serve*

(See arguments contained in Point III of

Appellants 1 brief, which point contained leight of the fourteen
pages of appellants argument.)
In view of the foregoing, the petitioners respectfully urge
the court to conclude*that the matter of the validity of the
guardianship proceedings was never beford the court; that the
validity of the guardianship could not be attacked in this
action, but only by the defendants properly filing a claim so as
to make the guardianship file a part of the proceedings, or by
filing in the guardianship file itself, thereby securing the
posting and giving of the required notices, the joinder of all
interested and essential parties, including the surety, the
introduction of evidence on that particulcar issue, etc., and,
that to do less t^an that would cause a s|:ignificant and radical
departure from tt\e normal procedures and rules of this court and
the statutes of this state, as well as cajuse no end of havoc and
mischief.

- 12 POINT III
A DEFAULTING DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT
OF AN UNASSERTED COUNTER-CLAIM.
The petitioners have little quarrel with the court's ruling
that there may be situations where the "successful defense of
some of several co-defendants may inure to the benefit of a
defaulting defendant*"

However, the petitioners urge that this

seems to be inappropriate proceedings for the court to apply that
conclusion.

The defendants, as a group, are much more than just

co-defendants in a law suit, where the defaulting defendants
benefit or obtain a benefit from the defense of the defendants
who do appear.

Surely a counter-claim involving the ability to

collect money or to foreclose a mortgage against property in lieu
thereof, is much, much more than a defense to a claim of a plaintiff.
Consider the following:
First, only a part of the defendants asserted a counterclaim, namely, Franklin Reed, Margaret Sue Reed, Cordie
Mae Reed and LaWanna Kay Reed.
Second, that fact would indicate or suggest that the other
defendants did not wish to assert their claim under the
mortgage, or that their claim had been satisfied.

This

seems particularly applicable where each of the mortgagees
have a stated amount of contribution to the mortgagor, and
the sum is identified in the mortgage instrument itself.
Third, for the court to conclude that because part of
the mortgagees claim that their contribution to the
mortgage was not satisfied, that the other mortgagees

- 13 claim was likewise not satisfied, is giving the defaulting
defendants far more than is either jiist or equitable
The stipulated facts were that "(t)hdre is no record of
payment or lack of payment by Ezilda and Charles Hendricks to the
defendants of the subject mortgage."

The petitioners did not

enjoy that type of "relationship" with the defendants that would
make them privy to that type of informatiqn.

Surely, the defend-

ants, as brothers and sisters, had that type of information, and
both those defendants who answered and those who did not answer,
in effect did admit that the defendants not answering had no
claim to assert. r£ the mortgagors had repaid any of their children, any
part or all of their contribution to the mortgage, then the
mortgagors would have been entitled to haye the mortgage reduced
by the amount that they paid to their chi dren.

It would seem to

the petitioners, that the mere refusal of the three (3) defendants
to answer the plaintiffs complaint, was ail admission that their
portion of the contribution had been repaid to them.

When the

four answering brothers and sisters neglected to include their
older brothers and sister in the counter-claim, was that a further
acknowledgement that they considered the Contribution of their
The appellants urge

brothers and sister to have been repaid?

that they are entitled to the presumption that those defendants
who did not counterclaim, had been satisfied as to their portion
of the contribution to the mortgage.

rF phe mortgage had merely

recited that the mortgage was for an aggregate sum only, and had
no reference to the contributions by each of the defendants, then
the result reached by the court would be understandable. However,

L

where the stipulated facts and the mortgabe are as they are,

- 14 -

and where only four (4) of the seven (7) defendants wish to
assert that the mortgage is unsatisfied, and bother to file a
counterclaim to foreclose the same, then, in such event, the
petitioners urge that it is more reasonable to conclude that the
unpaid amount due on the mortgage is that sum contributed by the
four that bothered to counterclaim, and that the other three are
presumed to have been paid.
Petitioners thus urge that the defaulting defendants, who
did not file a counterclaim, should surely be barred from any
recovery, and that neither law nor equity should allow the other
defendants, the counter-claimants, to collect or secure judgment
for the benefit of those defaulting defendants, who made their
election to make no claim for contribution or otherwise.
POINT IV
APPELLATE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER BOTH THE STIPULATED
FACTS AND THE LAW IN THIS PROCEEDING.
Due to the unusal nature of the entire proceedings, and the
obvious lack of appellants' personal knowledge regarding the
dealings between the defendants and their parents, the facts were
all stipulated to in writing at the trial of the matter.
witnesses were called, and none testified.

No

The trial court thus

had no opportunity to personally observe witnesses, their demeanor,
their conduct, their believability, or lack of believability.

It

would seem, that on appeal, that the findings of fact, etc., by
the lower court should be given no greater credence or effect than tha
which could or might be reached by this court.

This relates not

only to the question of the foreclosure of the mortgage by part
of the defendants, but as to the evidence or lack of evidence

- 15 before the court relative to the guardianship proceeding, for the
stipulated facts should not be subject to that many different
interpretations, since there were no witnesses for the trial
court to personally scrutinize, etc.

Petitioners thus urge this

court to review its previous decision, and the decision of the
lower court in light of the same.

CONCLUSION
Petitioners urge the court to reconsider its decision that
the guardianship was a nullity, for the reason that such a
decision was improperly reached and concluded in this proceeding,
and, was not based upon facts sufficient to conclude the same.
If the court will reconsider its decisiori on the "nullity" of the
guardianship, then petitioners request tq is court to also reconsider the effect of that guardianship on the question of foreclosure of the mortgage, the statute of limitations, and the
right of the petitioners to assert the ba|r of the statute of
limitations to defendants foreclosure of the same.
In the event the court shall refuse to reconsider its
decision on the "nullity" of the guardian!ship, then the petitioners
still submit that the court should recons ider its 1 decision as to
the effect of that portion of the mortgage attributed to contributio
by the three defaulting defendants, i.e., that the mortgage
should be reduced by the amount of that contribution.
Respectfully submitted,

George M. Mangan,
Attorney\ f o r Petitiofrfers

